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The purpose of this study is to re-estimates the size of shadow economy in Malaysia and investigates the role 
play by the financial sector development in mitigating the size of shadow economy. Our results suggest that 
individual income tax burden has an impact on shadow economy in Malaysia; indicating that lower personal 
tax rate discourages people from participating in the shadow economy in Malaysia. On the other hand, 
increase in national income and government consumption also reduce shadow economy; while increase in 
misery increases shadow economy in Malaysia. One policy implication from this study is that the Malaysian 
government should embark on programs that can reduce the size of the shadow economy by removing barriers 
for easy access to the credit market and further reform of the financial sector should be the focus. 
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1.     INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a plethora of empirical studies estimating the size of shadow economy in various countries 
all over the world. The work is important because the presence of shadow economy in any nation 
affects the economic decision of the government and the welfare of the public (Schneider & Enste, 
2000). Furthermore, studies have shown that shadow economy is also related to criminal activities 
(Naylor, 1996; Habibullah & Eng, 2006). In terms of economic growth, Eilat & Zinnes (2002) 
posit that shadow economy may cripple an economy by reducing the tax base and eventually 
reduces overall tax revenue which is much needed for government expenditure on public 
infrastructure and enhancing economic development. On the other hand, by excluding shadow 
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economy from the official gross domestic product (GDP) statistics, the official GDP statistics will 
provide wrong indicators for macroeconomic policy decisions. Furthermore, in the labor market, 
since firms participate in the shadow economy are not subjected to labor regulations, workers are 
exploited and have to endure unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, receiving very low wages 
and with no job security (see Eilat & Zinnes, 2002). Thus, fighting shadow economy should be an 
important agenda for any government. 
 
There are many reasons as to why peoples or firms participate in the shadow economy. Schneider 
(2005), Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008), and Bajada and Schneider (2005) posit that tax burden 
either direct or indirect taxation, social security contribution, regulation, tax morale, 
unemployment rate, GDP per capita are important factors pushing people into the shadow 
economy. Other variables such as government spending or consumption (Vo & Ly, 2014; Wang, 
Lin, & Yu, 2006; Buehn & Schneider, 2012); weak government and bad governance (Friedman, 
Johnson, Kaufman, & Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Manolas, Rontos, Sfakianakis, & Vavouras, 2013); 
lack of trust for the government (D’Hernoncourt & Meon, 2012); crime rate (Wang et al., 2006); 
and inflation (Bittencourt, Gupta, & Stander, 2014); are all contributed in increasing the size of the 
shadow economy. 
 
Nonetheless, economists have also recognized that the lack of access to the financial or credit 
market could encourage people to participate in the shadow economy. The proponents of this strand 
of studies postulate that with the absence of asymmetric information, individual or firm will have 
easy access to the credit market and will benefited by increasing their output through the use of the 
borrowed financing. Bose,  Capasso and Wurm (2012) argue that in higher level of financial sector 
development, firms have easy access to external financing, however, borrowers have to declare 
their income and/or assets and this can be used as collateral or to gauge their creditworthiness but 
in doing so they will subject to tax liability. But, since the value provided by the financial sector is 
considerable (Gordon & Li, 2009), there is less incentive to evade tax and the need to participate 
in the shadow economy is minimal. On the contrary, for countries with lower level of financial 
development, where there is limited access to the credit market due to shortage of loanable funds, 
asymmetric information and high cost of borrowings; borrowers have less incentive to declare 
income and/or assets. In such environment, tax evasion is substantial and shadow economy is also 
larger. Thus, Bose et al. (2012) contend that improvement in the development of the banking sector 
as well as the depth and the efficiency of the banking sector contribute to smaller shadow economy. 
 
The contention made by Bose et al. (2012) is supported by Blackburn, Bose and Capasso (2012) 
who explained the connection between shadow economic activity and the credit market 
development using a simple model of tax evasion and financial intermediation. According to 
Blackburn et al. (2012) potential borrowers are required to declare their income or wealth in order 
to acquire a loan to finance their investment. The amount of wealth will determine the amount of 
collateral for securing a loan and also the type of terms and conditions of the loan contract made 
available to them. The less wealth been declared, the less collateral to secure the required loan, and 
the worse will be the terms and condition of the loan contract. As a consequence, the credit 
arrangement is worsen in a country with low level of financial development. Thus, the benefit of 
wealth disclosure increases with the level of financial development with the implication that 
individual or firm participate in the shadow economy decline as the economy moves from a low to 
high level of financial development.  
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On one hand, Capasso and Jappelli (2013) put forward that for a firm to earn high-return 
technology investment, firms have to acquire external funding. However, this kind of investment 
is expensive and costly. Nevertheless, firm can reduce the cost of funding by disclosing part or all 
of their assets and pledging them as collateral. The disclosure decision, however, also involves 
higher tax payments and reduces tax evasion. Their model predict that financial development (a 
reduction in the cost of credit) induces firm to disclose more assets and to invest in a high-tech 
project, and an improvement in the judicial efficiency reduces the cost of credit and the size of the 
shadow economy. Bittencourt et al. (2014), on the other hand, argue that countries with higher 
level of financial development will have a lower cost of monitoring provided that borrowers are 
willing to declare their income to the bank. However, borrowers that choose to undeclared their 
income to the bank will be subjected to higher costs of access to and conditions of obtaining loans. 
These higher costs and with lower level of financial development, will provides an incentive for 
borrowers to participate in the shadow economy. 
 
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to re-estimate the size of the shadow economy in Malaysia for 
the period 1970 to 2013 and further to determine factors affecting shadow economy. Our focus is 
to test the conjecture made by Bose et al. (2012) and Blackburn et al. (2012) on the role of the 
financial sector development as a vehicle to reduce shadow economy. Other variables included in 
the study are national income, tax burden, government consumption, and misery index. The period 
of the study is from 1970 to 2013. 
 
 
2.     ESTIMATES OF SHADOW ECONOMY IN MALAYSIA 
 
Activities in the shadow economy are hidden and participants in every each way avoid detection, 
and given the lack of resources to monitor their activities, the authorities have a daunting task to 
identify and estimate the size of the shadow economy (Singh, Jain-Chandra, & Mohommad, 2012). 
In the case of Malaysia, there were efforts by several researchers to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy. The first effort to estimates the size of shadow economy in Malaysia was due to Kanbur, 
Majid and Muhamad (1993). They estimate that the size of shadow economy in Malaysia ranges 
from 0.23% to 1.20% of GDP for the period 1980 to 1985 (cited in Mohamed, 2012; Kasipillai, 
Baldry, & Rao, 2000). Mahfar (1994) and Abdul (2001) estimate the size of Malaysia’s shadow 
economy to be 30% and 29%, respectively; while Aziz (2004) came up with estimates of 19.7% to 
13.2% between the years 1987 to 1997 (see Mohamed, 2012). According to an expert opinion 
surveyed by Kasipillai (1998) in 1995, the construction sector contributes the highest hidden 
income; while Mohammad (2004) reports that the services sector in 2002 formed the largest 
percentage of informal sector relative to the formal sector with an estimated ratio of 4.2%. 
However, the 2006 statistics provided by Kamaruddin and Ali (2006) suggest that 24% of firms in 
the information technology industry operate underground, and this is followed by manufacturing 
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1970  60.46     18.14 
1971 8.1 59.41     21.14 
1972 7.62 57.79     27.58 
1973 7.36 56.49     38.38 
1974 8.35 54.75     49.80 
1975 7.87 52.29     55.77 
1976 8.11 51.31     58.77 
1977 8.22 50.3     65.73 
1978 8.61 48.98     66.62 
1979 8.54 47.84     67.24 
1980 8.76 46.55 10.92    71.75 
1981 8.48 45.13 10.92    66.97 
1982 8.31 43.66 10.92    67.88 
1983 8.53 42.2 10.92    66.05 
1984 8.43 30.97 10.92 28.8 18.9  65.63 
1985 6.84 39.78 12.19 28.9 21.9  64.44 
1986 6.78 39.29 12.19 28.2 19.7  68.40 
1987 6.21 39.11 12.19 25.1 16.8  68.84 
1988 6.15 39.07 12.19 31.1 17.5  69.73 
1989 5.91 38.86 12.19 34 17.5  62.97 
1990 5.19 38.45 17.17 35.4 17.5  58.50 
1991 4.69 37.97 17.17 36.5 17.6 37.47 58.99 
1992 4.72 36.91 17.17 36.6 18 37.3 47.58 
1993 3.7 36.08 17.17 33.3 14.7 36.79 36.49 
1994 3.73 35.06 17.17 31 15.7 35.04 37.23 
1995  34 23.19 30.6 16.1 33.22 35.89 
1996  32.82 23.19 26.8 16.1 30.58 33.54 
1997  31.85 23.19 27.1 19 30.37 34.07 
1998  30.7 23.19 25.1 21.5 32.1 44.06 
1999  30.61 23.19 26.9 14.6 31.63 48.56 
2000  30.8 18.31 27.9 14.6 31.1 37.34 
2001  30.5 18.31 31.5 19.3 32.27 31.78 
2002  30.38 18.31 31.5 15.4 32.65 29.87 
2003  30.2 18.31 30.5 15 32.03 30.20 
2004  30.1 18.31 31.1 16.8 30.59 28.42 
2005  29.9 12.83 29.8 18.1 29.77 27.05 
2006  29.8 12.83 30.7 17.9 29.21 26.85 
2007  29.6 12.83  15.3 29.23 25.63 
2008  29.34 12.83  16.4 30.03 26.23 
2009   12.83  17.4 31.71 24.99 
2010     12.4 30.17 24.38 
2011     15.4 29.82 23.99 




















2012     14.9 29.78 22.48 
2013      29.84 21.95 
2014      26.41  
2015      27.87  
Sources: Kasipillai et al. (2000), Elgin and Oztunali (2012), Mohamed (2012), Alm and Embaye (2013), Tan, Habibullah, 
Kaliappan and Radam (2017) and Medina and Schneider (2017). 
 
Table 1 reports the time series estimates of the size of the shadow economy by different authors 
for Malaysia. These estimates were derived either from a single country estimates or a panel setting 
framework. For example, Kasipillai et al. (2000) estimate the size of the Malaysian shadow 
economy for the period 1971-1994 using the standard currency demand approach; ranging from 
8.1% to gross national product in 1971 to 3.73% in 1994; averaging 7.1% over the 24 years period. 
Elgin and Oztunali (2012) estimate the magnitude of the shadow economy involving 161 countries 
by employing the two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model over the period 1955-2008; with 
Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 47% during that period. Using the non-tax compliant 
method, Mohamed (2012) compute the average size of shadow economy in Malaysia to be 10.92% 
for 1980-1984, 12.19% for 1985-1989, 17.17% for 1990-1994, 23.19% for 1995-1999, 18.31% for 
2000-2004, and 12.83% for 2005-2009. Alm and Embaye (2013) estimate the size of the shadow 
economy for 111 countries using the generalized method of moments for the period 1984-2006 
and the estimated size for Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 30.4% for the period. Tan et al. 
(2017) estimate the size of shadow economy for a panel of 80 countries using the pooled mean 
group (PMG) estimator and the estimate for Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 17% for the 
period 1984 to 2012. On the other hand, Medina and Schneider (2017) by using a combination of 
the multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) procedure and the currency demand models; they 
have estimated the size of the shadow economy for 158 countries including Malaysia for the 
periods 1991 to 2015. For the 25 years period, Malaysia’s shadow economy averages 31.5% of the 
official GDP.  
 
Although it is recognized that there is no one method that is ideal to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy exists (Berger, Pickhardt, Pitsoulis, Prinz, & Sarda, 2014), in this study we endeavor to 
re-estimate the size of shadow economy for Malaysia using the modified-cash-deposit-ratio 
procedure proposed by Pickhardt and Sarda (2011, 2015). Pickhardt and Sarda (2011, 2015) claim 
that their approach offers a ‘reasonable’ estimate of the shadow economy and it do not subject to 
the Breusch and Ahumada critiques. According to Breusch (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) the weaknesses 
of the MIMIC model approach widely used to estimate the size of the shadow economy suffers 
from serious econometrical and mathematical flaws. On the other hand, Ahumada, Alvaredo and 
Canavese (2007, 2008) point out that the estimates of the size of the shadow economy using the 
currency demand approach is correct only if the long-run elasticity of income is unity, but, in most 
cases this is not the case.  
 
Thus, following Pickhardt and Sarda (2011, 2015) the ratio of shadow economy income to official 
income for Malaysia is computed using the modified-cash-deposit-ratio as (see also Habibullah, 
Din, Yusof-Saari & Baharom, 2016), 
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where 𝐶𝐶𝑡 denotes currency in circulation at the end of year 𝑡; 𝐶𝐶0 is currency in circulation at the 
end of base year, here 1969; 𝐷𝐷𝑡 represents demand deposits at the end of year 𝑡; 𝑌𝐿𝑡 and 𝑌𝑈𝑡 
denote the size of the legal and shadow economy respectively. Thus, 𝑌𝑈𝑡 𝑌𝐿𝑡⁄  measures the share 
of shadow economy to the legal economy (official GDP).  
 
The estimated size of Malaysia’s shadow economy for the period 1970 to 2013 is presented in the 
last column in Table 1. For the 44 years period, the average size of shadow economy in Malaysia 
is about 44.5%. Despite the differences in the data coverage, methods employed, the assumptions 
made and the variant estimates in the magnitude of the shadow economy in Malaysia, the estimated 
size of the shadow economy in Table 1 clearly shows that shadow economy in Malaysia, in general, 
is on a declining trend, in particularly after 1990. In fact, our estimates of the size of shadow 
economy coincide with several episodes of economic hardships and financial crises in Malaysia 
during those periods. Shadow economy has been increasing since the first oil shock of 1973/74; 
reaching the highest level during the second oil shock of 1979/81; reach another peak during the 
commodity price collapse of 1985/86; another sharp increase during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/99 –all these episodes have probably pushed peoples into the shadow economy.  
 
 
3.     MODELLING DETERMINANTS OF SHADOW ECONOMY IN MALAYSIA 
 
Following the work by Schneider (2005), Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008), Bajada and Schneider 
(2005), Vo and Ly (2014), Buehn and Schneider (2012), and Bittencourt et al. (2014), in this study 
we specify the long-run model for shadow economy in Malaysia as, 
 
 𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡  
 +𝜃4𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡
2 + 𝜃5𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃6𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (2) 
 
where 𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡  is the size of shadow economy as calculated as per Table 1; 𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑡 is the 
ratio of government consumption to gross domestic product (GDP); 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡  is real GDP per 
capita to measure economic development or income; 𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡 is the misery index calculated as 
inflation rate plus unemployment rate, and 𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡  is the ratio of taxation to GDP (𝑗=total 
tax revenue, direct taxation, indirect taxation, corporate tax, personal income tax, and sales and 
service tax); 𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡  is financial sector development measured by ratio of domestic credit to 
private sector to GDP; while 𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡
2 is financial sector development squared to establish 
whether the relationship between shadow economy and financial sector development is non-linear.  
 
If our data support the contention made by Blackburn et al. (2012) and Bose et al. (2012) in which 
the relationship between shadow economy and financial development exhibit an inverted U-shape 
curve, we would expect a priori that  𝜃3 > 0 and 𝜃4 < 0. This will imply that at lower stage of 
financial development shadow economy is increasing until at some turning point after which at 
higher level of financial development shadow economy starts to decrease. For the other variables, 
it is expected that the parameters, 𝜃5, 𝜃6 > 0 and 𝜃1, 𝜃2 < 0. The error term, 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is expected to be 
well behave with mean zero and constant variance. All variables are in natural logarithm which is 
denoted by 𝑙. 
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Estimating the long-run model as per Equation (2) is a challenge as we are dealing with time series 
variables which are normally non-stationary. Running Equation (2) using ordinary least square 
(OLS) will result in spurious regression unless we can establish that there is cointegration among 
the variables (i.e. long-run relationship among the variables). The most common method to test for 
cointegration is the Engle-Granger two-step procedure. However, to employ this cointegration 
procedure we must establish that all variables in their level are in the same order of integration, 
that is, they are all I(1); meaning that the series will becomes stationary (i.e. I(0)) after first-
differencing. To test whether the series is I(0) or I(1) in their level, we need to employ the unit root 
test. The most common unit root test is the augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) 
unit root test. However, in this study we will employ a more efficient unit root test proposed by 
Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). According to Elliott et al. (1996) their modified Dickey-
Fuller (DF) test statistic by using a generalized least squares (GLS) rationale has the best overall 
performance in terms of small-sample size and power, conclusively dominating the standard 
Dickey-Fuller test. In particular, Elliott et al. (1996: 813) found that their “DF-GLS test has 
substantially improved power when an unknown mean or trend is present.” 
 
3.1    Sources of Data 
 
In this study data on gross domestic product (GDP), real GDP per capita, government consumption, 
domestic credit to private sector, inflation and unemployment rates (for misery index) were 
collected from the World Development Indicators published online and accessible at the World 
Bank database (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). Government consumption and domestic 
credit to the private sector are express as a ratio to GDP; while misery index equals to inflation 
rate plus unemployment rate. Misery index will measure the “hardship” of the population of a 
country. On the other hand, data for all categories of tax burden such as the total tax revenue, total 
direct taxation, total indirect taxation, corporate taxation, individual taxation and total sales and 
services taxation were collected from various issues of the Monthly Statistical Bulletin published 
by the Bank Negara Malaysia. All these tax variables were deflated by GDP. 
 
 
4.     THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The unit root test results using the DF-GLS procedure are presented in Table 2. Results in Table 2 
clearly indicate that all variables are I(1), that is the series achieved stationarity after differencing 
once. These results clearly suggest that all variables are non-stationary in levels and their first-
differences are stationary, that is, they are I(0). A consequence of regressing integrated variables 
will produce spurious regression results. Spurious regression results will imply that inferences 
cannot be made and hypothesis testing will be invalid. Thus, estimating Equation (2) using OLS 
will result in spurious regression unless the variables are cointegrated. A cointegrating regression 
implies a long-run model for the shadow economy as specified in Equation (2). It also implies that 
there are long-run relationships between shadow economy and its determinants. Since all variables 
are I(1), that is they are of the same order of integration we can then proceed for cointegration test 
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Table 2: Results of DF-GLS Unit Root Tests 
Series Level: First-difference: 
Constant Constant & 
trend 
Constant Constant & 
trend 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑡 -1.60 (3) -1.77 (3) -3.87*** (0) -5.37*** (0) 
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 0.76 (1) -1.74 (0) -5.71*** (0) -6.00*** (0) 
𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑡  -1.60 (1) -2.72 (0) -7.90*** (0) -7.95*** (0) 
𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡 -0.25 (3) -1.00 (0) -2.39** (2) -6.66*** (0) 
𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡
2 -0.24 (0) -1.12 (0) -2.41** (2) -6.27*** (0) 
𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡 -1.39 (2) -2.79 (2) -8.27*** (0) -7.78*** (1) 
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡  -1.73 (0) -2.21 (0) -9.09*** (0) -9.40*** (0) 
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 -0.98 (0) -2.49 (0) -7.55*** (0) -7.70*** (0) 
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 0.21 (0) -1.85 (0) -7.73*** (0) -8.15*** (0) 
𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡  -1.57 (2) -2.82 (2) -7.62*** (0) -7.61*** (0) 
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 -1.44 (0) -2.21 (0) -6.01*** (0) -6.32*** (0) 
𝑙𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 -1.24 (0) -1.69 (0) -3.32*** (0) -5.05*** (0) 
Notes: Variables shadow, income, govtconsp, financial, misery, totaltax, directax, indirectax, corporatetax, individualtax 
and saleservicetax denote respectively, ratio of shadow economy to GDP, real GDP per capita, ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, misery index (inflation + unemployment rates), 
total tax revenue to GDP ratio, direct taxation to GDP ratio, indirect taxation to GDP ratio, corporate tax to GDP ratio, 
individual income tax to GDP ratio, and sales and service tax to GDP ratio. 𝑙 denotes natural logarithm. Asterisks (***), 
(**), (*) denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The optimal lag length in round brackets, 
(.) was chosen based on Schwarz criterion (SC) throughout the analysis. 
 
To test for cointegration and to estimate the long-run model, in the first step, we apply OLS with 
robust standard error due to Newey-West (Newey and West, 1987) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimates of the standard error on Equation (2). An important 
property of robust standard errors is that the form of the heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation 
does not need to be specified. The residual of the estimated regression are then saved. In the second 
step, we test the residual for unit root. This is the conventional Engle and Granger (1987) two-step 
procedure for testing the null hypothesis of non-cointegration or the present of unit root in the 
residuals. We test the residual whether they are I(0) or I(1) using the standard augmented Dickey-
Fuller unit root test. If the residual is stationary or I(0), we can conclude that there is cointegration 
implying that there is long-run relationship between shadow economy and its determinants. Table 
3 presents the results of the cointegration tests as well as the estimated long-run models for 
Malaysian shadow economy for all six categories of tax burden. Model 1 was estimated without 
any tax variable; while Model 2 to Model 7 respectively represents model that include total 
taxation, total direct taxation, total indirect taxation, corporate taxation, individual taxation and 
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Table 3: Results of Long-Run Model for Shadow Economy in Malaysia 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  1.0474 1.0470 2.4815 0.3558 0.9008 1.8339 3.6336 
 (0.3801) (0.3832) (0.9605) (0.1074) (0.3239) (0.7864) (1.3905) 
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 -1.2104*** -1.2105*** -1.2537*** -1.1167*** -1.2222*** -1.1236*** -1.3004*** 
 (8.9870) (8.4957) (8.9877) (5.7242) (8.6993) (9.2441) (10.422) 
𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑡  -0.6228** -0.6226* -0.7620** -0.5863** -0.6617** -0.6664*** -0.6869** 
 (2.2879) (1.9687) (2.5761) (2.0721) (2.1974) (3.1631) (2.5599) 
𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡 6.9599*** 6.9608*** 6.4206*** 6.7722*** 7.0868*** 6.2036*** 6.3080*** 
 (6.5511) (6.8918) (7.4045) (7.3732) (6.2998) (8.8472) (5.7886) 
𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡
2 -0.7757*** -0.7758*** -0.7187*** -0.7563*** -0.7936*** -0.7010*** -0.6954*** 
 (5.7779) (6.2306) (6.6873) (6.3797) (5.5351) (7.9320) (5.0890) 
𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡 0.2086** 0.2086** 0.2193** 0.2010** 0.2124** 0.2527*** 0.1068* 
 (2.3567) (2.2389) (2.4609) (2.1556) (2.3691) (3.1944) (1.7176) 
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡   -0.0004      
  (0.0012)      
𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡   0.2538     
   (1.3565)     
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡    0.0845    
    (0.5305)    
𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡      0.0939   
     (0.7427)   
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡      0.3737**  
      (2.0218)  
𝑙𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡       -0.1104 
       (0.9474) 
𝑅2  0.9036 0.9036 0.9084 0.9046 0.9045 0.9170 0.9225 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.8906 0.8875 0.8932 0.8887 0.8886 0.9032 0.9093 
SER 0.1366 0.1385 0.1350 0.1378 0.1379 0.1285 0.1217 
Schwarz criterion -0.7678 -0.6804 -0.7322 -0.6906 -0.6898 -0.8307 -0.9330 
𝐸 − 𝐺 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡:  -3.74*** -3.74*** -4.07*** -3.59*** -3.85*** -4.32*** -3.66*** 
Notes: Asterisks (***), (**) and (*) denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. SER denotes 
standard error of regression. For the long-run models (Models 1 – 7), figures in round brackets (.) are t-statistics. For the 
cointegration tests (with null hypothesis of non-cointegration), the E-G test denotes the DF t-statistics on the cointegrating 
regression’s residual, and the calculated statistics are those computed in MacKinnon (1996). 
 
As shown in Table 3 (refer to last row), the null hypothesis of non-cointegration can be rejected at 
the 1% level as shown by the E − G tests. We can therefore conclude that there is cointegration 
among the variables. Since the estimated Equation (2) exhibit cointgeration it also implies that 
there is long-run relationships between the shadow economy and its determinants and as such the 
estimated long-run model for shadow economy is non-spurious. In fact, in all cases, the estimated 
long-run models of the shadow economy suggest that generally; income, government consumption, 
financial development, tax burden and misery index are important determinants affecting 
Malaysia’s shadow economy. This is evident where all variables are statistically significant at least 
at the 10% level. The negative relationship between shadow economy and income (or real GDP 
per capita, 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡) suggest that an increase in national income or economic development will 
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lead to a reduction in the size of the shadow economy. Increase in the wealth of the nation gives 
more opportunity for individuals as well as firms to seek and earn higher income in the formal 
economy. Thus, people or firm will shift out of the shadow economy and contribute into the formal 
economy. 
 
Government consumption (𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑡) show negative relationship with the shadow economy. 
The inverse relationships between government consumption and shadow economy would suggest 
people’s satisfaction with the way government revenues has been spent appropriately. When 
people trusted their government, tax morale will be higher. Torgler (2005) argues that people will 
be more prone to pay taxes if they trust their fellow tax-payers to do the same, and if they trust the 
government to use tax revenues to finance public goods. In this situation high level of trust lead to 
high tax morale and consequently tax evasion (also shadow economy) will be low.  
 
As for the tax variables, we have estimated the models with six measures of taxes, however, only 
individual income tax is statistically significant from zero as shown by Model 6. Other tax 
measures are insignificant at the conventional level. The positive relationship between shadow 
economy and tax burden as shown by individual income tax (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡) indicate that 
increasing individual income tax will encourage people to participate in the shadow economy. 
Thus, direct taxation such as individual income tax is a burden to the Malaysian population. This 
will imply that reduction in individual tax rate will help to mitigate shadow economy in Malaysia. 
Misery index measures the hardship of the people due to both inflation and unemployment rates, 
and therefore another form of burden to the Malaysian population. In the worst scenario, an 
increase in both inflation and unemployment rates will increase the misery (hardship) index and 
consequently will increase the size of the shadow economy. As shown in Table 3, the misery index 
(𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑡) indicates a positive effect on the shadow economy in Malaysia. The combined effect 
of both inflation and unemployment rates will push people into the shadow economy seeking for 
employment in order to substantiate their income as well as looking for cheaper goods and services. 
Thus, government program that could provide more job opportunity as well business opportunity 
and low level of inflation rate will induce people to participate in the official economy. 
 
Nevertheless, our main interest that emerges from this study is the non-linear relationship shown 
between shadow economy and financial development in Malaysia. As indicated by the sign of 𝜃3 
being positive while 𝜃4 is negative in all estimated models, this would suggest an inverted U-shape 
curve – a non-linear relationship between the shadow economy and financial development in 
Malaysia. The inverted U-shape curve suggests that as financial development progress in Malaysia 
from lower to higher level, shadow economy at first increases and after a certain optimal point, 
thereafter shadow economy decreases as financial development increases. Our findings support the 
contention made by Bose et al. (2012), Blackburn et al. (2012) and Bittencourt et al. (2014) that 
access to finance is difficult at lower level of financial development and players seek alternative 
financing and participate in the shadow economy; but as financial sector develops and becomes 
more sophisticated (in particular in terms of information sharing that will reduce asymmetric 
information between participants), access to finance will be much easier, cost of financing becomes 
cheaper, players willing to participate in the formal economy as the opportunity cost in 
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5.     CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we have re-estimated the size of the shadow economy for Malaysia for the periods 
1970 to 2013. After which we have examined the factors affecting shadow economy in Malaysia 
during the same period. We relate the size of shadow economy with its determinants – income, 
government consumption, financial development, tax burden and “hardships” measured by the 
misery index. Our estimated long-run models suggest that declining income (say, economic 
recessions) and increase in individual income tax rate, increases the size of the shadow economy. 
Our results further suggest that government spending mitigate the size of the shadow economy in 
Malaysia. When people perceived that tax revenue has been spent appropriately and for good used, 
probably on public infrastructure and services, satisfied population refrain from participating in 
the shadow economy. Further, miserable life experience by the people as they are unemployed but 
at the same time facing higher inflation rate will also lead them into the shadow economy. 
 
Importantly, our study reveals that the relationship between shadow economy and financial 
development in Malaysia is nonlinear and exhibit an inverted U-shape curve; suggesting that 
shadow economy increases at lower level of financial development but as financial development 
increases further, shadow economy ultimately decreases. Thus, our findings support the earlier 
work of Bose et al. (2012), Blackburn et al. (2012) and Bittencourt et al. (2014). An important 
policy implication is that the Malaysian government as well as Bank Negara Malaysia should 
embark on programs that can discourage people or firm from participating in the shadow economy. 
Programs on financial inclusion and further reform of the financial sector should be the focus. For 
example, by providing avenue for easy access to the credit market and further reform of the capital 
market sector. Since Malaysia practice dual banking system by having both conventional banks 
and Islamic banks; Islamic banks and Islamic capital markets can play a pivotal in the effort to 
enhance financial inclusion to the “unbanked” population especially among the rural and 
“hardcore” religious community that refused the conventional banks that practice usury. Islamic 
finance can also play an important role in providing finances to the small and medium enterprises 
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